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Abstract  
Recent research has exposed disagreements over the nature and usefulness of what may (or 
may not) be Human-Computer Interaction’s fundamental phenomenon: ‘interaction’. For 
some, HCI’s theorising about interaction has been deficient, impacting its capacity to inform 
decisions in design, suggesting the need either to perform first-principles definition work or 
broader administrative clarification and formalisation of the multitude of formulations of the 
concepts of interaction and their particular uses. For others, there remain open questions over 
the continued relevance of certain ‘versions’ of interaction as a useful concept in HCI at all. 
We pursue a different perspective in this paper, reviewing how HCI treats interaction through 
examining its ‘conceptual pragmatics’ within HCI’s discourse. We argue that articulations of 
the concepts of interaction can be a site of productive conflict for HCI that for many reasons 
may resist attempts of formalisation as well as attempts to dispense with them. The main 
contribution of this paper is in specifying how we might go about talking of interaction and 
the value of interaction language as promiscuous concepts. 
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1. Introduction 
Concepts of ‘interaction’ have been used in HCI as ways of talking about the myriad forms of 
relations that emerge amongst and between people living with and around digital devices and 
systems. Sometimes, the wide range of senses in which concepts of interaction are used in 
HCI is a source of confusion. There are many different and potentially incommensurate ways 
of constituting and schematising what we mean when we say ‘interaction’, ‘interacting’, 
‘interactivity’, and so on. Looking to this journal alone, for example, yields the following: 
multimodal interaction (Deng et al., 2017), sonic interaction (Rocchesso & Serafin, 2009), 
ubiquitous interaction (Kostakos & Musolesi, 2013), touch interaction (Ghosh et al., 2019), 
and interaction with virtual environments (Wilson, 2005). For some in HCI, this has become 
problematic.  
To be clear, we will not address that issue in this paper. Instead we chart a different course by 
unpacking what the concepts of interaction let HCI do. One’s understanding of a concept 
constrains and influences the way that concept can be worked with (Beck & Ekbia, 2018). 
We do not think that this has yet been articulated in response to HCI’s “current turbulence” 
(Kuutti & Bannon, 2014). 
In order to head off confusions, we are going to asterisk ‘interaction’1 to remind the reader 
(and ourselves) that we are interested not in addressing what ‘interaction’—its various 
versions included—might be in and of itself.  Rather, interaction* is about bracketing the 
matter, i.e., considering, in a broad sense, HCI’s concept(s) of interaction and the 
conversations about them. So, this is what we mean when we say interaction* here: so 
instead read ‘the concepts of interaction’.  
Recently, researchers have been taking stock of the import of interaction* for HCI’s 
disciplinary development. These positions can be construed as divergent. For some there is a 
case being made for the continued relevance of interaction* to HCI through better formal 
                                               
1 To clarify, we are not addressing any versions of interaction directly, nor do we intend a specific sense of or 
perspective on what we mean by ‘interaction’. This, we feel, has been done far more comprehensively than we 
ever could in this article, and so we refer the reader to treatments by Hornbæk and Oulasvirta (2017), Janlert and 
Stolterman (2017a, 2017b), Dubberly et al. (2009), etc. We hope that our bracketing of interaction foregrounds 
some of the reasoning HCI researchers are employing so as to produce an objective stability to the concept in 
use (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 30-33). 
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definition. For others, there is frustration about the limitations of HCI’s renderings of 
interaction* and an implied dismissal of interaction* from the realm of the cutting edge. The 
broader tone of these debates thus can be seen to split in two potentially divergent directions. 
The former rests on the implication that, although HCI’s research uses interaction*’s 
language and its variants frequently, we do not really know what it is that we mean, and thus 
there is a need for definitional work. The latter makes a case for new conceptual apparatus 
entirely. 
Yet, this debate raises questions which are perhaps even more fundamental: What are recent 
discussions about interaction* doing for HCI research communities? Where might they 
spring from? What could we mean when we talk about interaction* in HCI? How does HCI 
talk about interaction* and its associated or implied language families? How might we 
evaluate proposals to define or dismiss interaction*? Are there other ways we can think about 
interaction* and its role in HCI? In short, we need to talk about how HCI approaches debates 
on interaction*2, just as much as some might feel developing particular concepts of 
interaction as a viable topic for HCI’s work. 
We offer an argument that proposes interaction* and its languages as promiscuous concepts 
that—in spite of potential negative connotations of this term—denotes interaction*’s positive, 
actively generative, wholesale permissive character. Interaction* acts as a pragmatic—but not 
infallible or unbreakable—’gravitational force’ that holds together the shifting sands of HCI’s 
research communities just enough so as to be useful. In being this way, interaction* offers 
opportunities for new associations or affiliations. In doing this we want to foreground 
interaction* (the idea, its discourse) to surface what we feel are various submerged 
misunderstandings and crossed wires. 
We begin by describing some motivating issues. These suggest why, we think, discussions of 
interaction* have taken hold in HCI in recent years. We then outline the broad shape of 
emerging interaction* debates that suggest different disciplinary pulls. Finally, we make 
some arguments for retaining interaction* by reframing its troublesome nature as a matter of  
                                               
2 To translate the bracketing again for the utmost clarity: i.e., we call for HCI’s reflection on how its discourse 
on the concepts of interaction plays out. 
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language. Finally we sketch ways for HCI to cope with this through a therapeutic approach 
informed by understandings of ordinary language. 
2. The problem with interaction* 
Recently in HCI, interaction* has (re)surfaced as a focal topic in its own right. Communities 
of HCI researchers’ treatments of interaction* are multitudinous, however we restrict our 
view here to two seemingly oppositional treatments (the situation is more complex, as we 
argue later, as they represent an evolving set of conversations rather than coagulated 
positions). To summarise we detect two broad directions. 1. ‘Defining’: seeking to formally 
arrange descriptions of a specific perspective on interaction* or schematise perspectives on 
interaction* with a view to establishing some measure of agreement in HCI (including its 
boundaries). And 2. ‘Dispensing’: a tendency to argue that clear conceptual constraints 
within HCI’s interaction* discourse suggests the abandonment of interaction in some fashion 
or another. (This is our particular reading of the debate, and the reader of this paper should 
bear that in mind.) 
2.1 Defining interaction*  
As Hornbæk and Oulasvirta—hereon, H&O—argue in their 2017 CHI paper, while “the term 
interaction” is often held to be “field-defining” and a “workhorse”, it is, in their view, 
“underdefined”. Accordingly, H&O’s paper is perhaps the most comprehensive of recent 
work attempting to address interaction* in HCI. In doing so it offers something of a catalogue 
approach to what H&O see as a problem of profound historic disinterest in systematic 
articulations of interaction* in HCI. By catalogue approach we mean that H&O advance their 
argument by presenting a range of different “concepts of interaction” (i.e., interaction*) that 
they contend are largely inexplicit, submerged or “underdefined” (in H&O’s words), but 
nevertheless drive different threads of HCI’s research. These are set in contrast with the “folk 
notions of interaction” (ibid., p. 1) as presented in HCI textbooks wherein H&O argue that 
one might reasonably expect a “definition or high-level discussion of interaction” (ibid., p. 1), 
and yet nevertheless fail to locate such a thing3. For example, we might consider how 
particular senses of interaction* can be a way of speaking in a language that reasons about 
                                               
3 While believe this pursuit to be the result of a confusion, we temper this with the point that there are times 
when looking for more definition can be generative. 
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models of stimulation and response between people, while in another mode of working 
interaction* be conceptualised as an interpretive process performed by members of social 
groupings (in accord with particular psychological and sociological influences in HCI 
respectively). There are many more examples like these, which are documented by H&O. 
Overall the schema H&O present seems to stand as a reaction to the many ways of talking 
about interaction* which can be ‘at play’ at any time in no distinctly differentiated way 
within HCI’s discourse, yet with potentially highly substantive differences in use and sense 
for the communities which employ them.  
The purpose for HCI, state H&O, is thus to “move from a folk notion of interaction to a 
notion that really explains interaction” (ibid., p. 7). This means locating causal reasoning that 
accounts for matters such as “how intentions are formed or affected by interaction” (ibid., p. 
8). Overall, the absence of definition work in HCI seems to be a key motivating factor for 
H&O, with the view that practicing such definition work and developing fully causal 
explanations for interaction* will lead to an increase in HCI’s “problem-solving capacity” 
(Oulasvirta & Hornbæk, 2016). 
Some of these concerns also emerge in contemporary work. Janlert and Stolterman 
(2017a)4—hereon, J&S—mirroring H&O’s complaint about “folk notions of interaction”—
suggest that HCI’s understandings of interaction* rely too much on “common intuitions”5 
and that “interactivity”—J&S’s focal interaction* word—needs to be approached “in a 
systematic and analytical fashion”. Although J&S hang their address of interaction* upon the 
question of “increasing interactivity”—that a key feature of designed systems is in providing 
different amounts of “interactivity”—ultimately, they return to the motivations of H&O by 
building up definitions and terms, albeit in a way that does not clearly consist of a plurality of 
alternatives, unlike H&O’s catalogue. In many ways, J&S present a particular but very 
explicitly stated attempt at a figuration of some sense of interaction* that could conceptually 
reside somewhere within H&O’s schema.  
                                               
4 We also refer the reader to Janlert and Stolterman’s book Things That Keep Us Busy: The Elements of 
Interaction (Janlert & Stolterman, 2017b) which also seeks further definition of interaction*. 
5 This is similar to what Galle would call intuitive resonance (Galle, 2011, p. 82). In brief, people think that the 
term will be understood by their audience and so they do not offer a definition in an effort to preserve resources 
(e.g., page space) for other purposes. 
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As noted by H&O, explicit attempts at core definitional work remain sparse. One exception 
we would point to is a cybernetic conception articulated by Dubberly et al. (2009). This is 
more consonant with the interaction design orientation of J&S6 yet probably falls within the 
“interaction as control” conceptual orientation covered by H&O (even though Dubberly et 
al.’s paper is not cited by H&O). Dubberly et al. directly approach what they mean by 
“interaction”, arguing that, in an interaction design sense, their way of articulating 
“interaction” is as a “way of framing the relationship between people and objects designed 
for them—and thus a way of framing the activity of design” (p. 96). Like H&O and J&S, 
then, Dubberly et al. seek to firm up a particular sense of interaction* through greater 
conceptual definition. 
Softer still than definitional work is the staking out of specific communities. This includes 
attempts to foreground something like agreement for interaction* that sets of HCI scholars 
approach in a consistent way (i.e., either recognising or developing a common orientation 
towards what constitute relevant phenomena for a community / perspective, such as sonic 
interaction (Rocchesso & Serafin, 2009) or ubiquitous interaction (Kostakos & Musolesi, 
2013)). Perhaps the clearest programmatic statement of this sort may be found in recent 
arguments for, or at least recognition of an extant “interaction science” or “science of 
interaction”7 in HCI. This has been pursued both by a Special Interest Group meeting (Howes 
et al., 2014) and “Spotlight” at CHI 20148, undergirded by the parallel commencement of a 
Journal of Interaction Science in 2013 (Bahr, 2013).  
2.2 Dispensing with interaction*? 
For us, H&O’s paper in particular sits quite clearly in response to prior work by Taylor 
(“After Interaction” (Taylor, 2015)), Verbeek (“Beyond Interaction” (Verbeek, 2015)), and 
Kuutti and Bannon (“The Turn to Practice in HCI” (Kuutti & Bannon, 2014))—hereon K&B. 
                                               
6 It seems common to conflate (or at least not clearly distinguish) interaction design and human-computer 
interaction in discussions of interaction*; e.g., see Svanæs’ (2013) chapter “Philosophy of Interaction” in 
https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/book/the-encyclopedia-of-human-computer-interaction-2nd-
ed/philosophy-of-interaction 
7 We note the distinction here for these are potentially two different programmes. 
8 See https://chi2014.acm.org/spotlights/interaction-science for more details (verified May 2019). 
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Collectively, they offer serious challenges to a definition-driven model of interaction*. 
Taylor and Verbeek put forward a set of convincing arguments about the possible ways in 
which interaction* might limit, and in some cases repress, HCI’s potential and scope. K&B, 
on the other hand, argue more for the recognition of a pre-existing “Practice paradigm” that 
can complement what they label as the existing “Interaction paradigm” in HCI.  
Taylor argues that expressions of interaction* in HCI have been tied conceptually to the 
materiality of user interfaces as well as conceptual configurations of human-machine 
binaries. He states that interaction*’s formulation in this way has led HCI to “concentrate [...] 
attentions on the interface” to the exclusion of other things that HCI correspondingly lacks 
the conceptual apparatus to deal with, such as broader structural-societal issues. Verbeek 
argues that the concept of “mediation” may be more apposite for design, while Taylor 
suggests that design constructs complex entanglements between human and machine to 
constitute “worlds” rather than merely “discrete interaction[s]”9 of mainstream HCI. What 
kind of “worlds” HCI could or should be building is the question: current interaction* in HCI 
hinders deeper thinking on that matter. Taylor and Verbeek thus find HCI’s senses of 
interaction* to be insufficient and constraining. In many ways we concur. 
One way of misreading the ‘interaction* is deficient’ view is by characterising it as an 
argument against what Taylor posits as the prevalence of Engelbartian interaction—a 
reference to Engelbart’s famous “Mother of all Demos” which Taylor argues set the scene for 
HCI’s ‘default’ sense of interaction*. Engelbartian interaction, suggests Taylor, “prefigures 
an interface, foregrounding a very particular set of relations between user and computer” that 
is naturally limited in its scope. H&O appear to take Taylor in the mode of rejecting 
Engelbartian interaction; suggesting that it must be done away with in order to correct HCI’s 
design role as “mediator” and focus on the enactment of “worlds” through design.  
However, we take Taylor’s argument to be more complex than that. Taylor argues that 
Engelbartian interaction is “taken for granted” in HCI and interaction design, but then 
appears to generalise this by noting that “as a concept, interaction hinges on an outmoded 
notion of technology in use” (emphasis added). On the one hand, this could be read as a 
                                               
9 The discussion ensuing from Taylor’s article has been documented online (https://ast.io/back-to-interaction/), 
which itself initiated a subsequent workshop at Microsoft Research Cambridge in 2016 (see 
https://ast.io/promiscuity-of-interaction/ for a report). 
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challenge to an imagined status quo—a unitary sense of specific Engelbartian interaction—
and, on the other, “outmoded notion” might apply to whatever other senses of interaction* 
we have in mind, which, as H&O point out, is a broad set of possibilities. Hence, there is 
potential for a pejorative characterisation of HCI’s senses of interaction* and, indeed, this is 
moved upon by H&O.  
Verbeek’s suggestion to go “Beyond Interaction” is similarly vexed. The provocative title is 
not matched by provocative content in the article. Verbeek is actually somewhat muted in 
that he argues both that “interaction might not always be the most helpful concept” for design 
and that, considering present deficiencies in interaction*, newer concepts of “technological 
mediation” are “shedding new light on the field of interaction design”. This feels more 
pluralistic than the way H&O seem to take it. However, we can see why “Beyond 
Interaction” has the potential to be treated as a way of dispensing with interaction* entirely. 
K&B on the other hand present the “turn to practice” within HCI as the gradual establishment 
of an alternate to the “Interaction paradigm” which has “tended to focus on momentary and 
ahistorical HCI situations”. While K&B underline the importance of the “Interaction 
paradigm” that is “brimming with unresolved problems”, and therefore distance themselves 
from a dispensing view, they do present an argument with a shared genetics to Taylor’s and 
Verbeek’s. K&B point to the limitations of the “Interaction paradigm” and the need for a 
“decentering” of the “privileged position of interaction”, resulting in a focus on practices 
instead: 
For the Practice paradigm, a whole practice is the unit of intervention; not only 
technology, but everything related and interwoven in the performance is under scrutiny 
and potentially changeable, depending on the goals of the intervention. Thus the 
changing technology is but one of the options. (Kuutti & Bannon, 2014) 
While Taylor, Verbeek, and K&B’s interventions feel productive for HCI, we are cautious 
about readings that adopt even a mild dispensing view of any sense of interaction*. Even 
K&B’s respectful account of two “paradigms” in HCI tends to put them into a relationship 
that might be construed as antagonistic. Furthermore, while Engelbartian interaction may 
have “become a cornerstone for HCI and interaction design (IxD)” as Taylor writes, and 
though it seems reasonable to concur with Verbeek that developing new notions such as 
“technological mediation” seem fruitful, H&O’s response puts forward a comprehensive case 
that these are potentially impoverished and somewhat, probably unintentional, straw man 
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views of the sheer diversity of interaction* present in HCI. Yet, as we have made clear, this is 
nevertheless done by H&O under the auspices of seeking further definitional and schematised 
clarity about interaction*, about which we exercise caution. 
To some extent, Verbeek’s argument also tends to be parseable as constructing a straw man 
of interaction* in HCI by not giving a clear sense of what is meant when he uses 
“interaction”. The implication is probably a specific “interaction as dialogue” sense, but the 
reader is left wondering, unlike Taylor’s piece where the argument singles out HCI’s 
overreliance on defaulting to Engelbartian interaction which is fortunate enough to have a 
clear cultural reference for its own definition. Due to ambiguity, Verbeek’s characterisations 
of interaction may then be criticised as insufficiently expressive. However, like J&S, once 
again the language of implicitness, agency, control, etc. all surface here as underlying driving 
concerns. (So, there are points of common ground in our sketch of the different ways of 
treating interaction*.) 
This also points to an issue with our initial binary categorisation, between what we have 
called the ‘interaction* defining’ and the ‘interaction* dispensing’ tendencies. We are not 
arguing that H&O, J&S, Taylor, Verbeek, or K&B are definitively motivated by this, 
intended the effect, or would necessarily agree with our characterisations. K&B, for instance, 
explicitly state they are not suggesting what they call the “Interaction paradigm” should 
“disappear”. Rather, we detect implications about where the state of HCI’s interaction* 
discussion could lead, as perhaps any reader of their work might. And this is worth exploring 
and road-testing if they are to be adopted by other HCI researchers in the future.  
In a sense HCI’s discourse on interaction* is about authors’ divergent reactions to 
‘discipline’: either as agents of ‘disciplining’ or instead feeling the effects of being 
disciplined. In other words, rejecting the usefulness of interaction* in whatever form could be 
seen as a response to the constraints felt from the kinds of disciplinary articulations of HCI 
we have discussed in this paper (e.g., that HCI has concepts X, Y, Z and A, B, C ways of 
applying them, thus constituting HCI’s agreements on interaction*). When we foreground 
this largely unstated dynamic—restating the debate on interaction* as an effect of 
disciplinarity itself—we think it sheds light on the frictions at play in a way that we imagine 
few would want to explicitly sign up to as the intended effect.  
We have tried to illustrate how the current discussions at times appear to suffer from cross-
purposes and ambiguity about what might even be meant by interaction*. We also suggest 
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that this discussion lacks a clear articulation of the position we present here: interaction* as a 
kind of generative broker between a complex mix of interlocking communities that form HCI 
research. 
We will next try to excavate the disciplinary milieu in the midst of which this discussion 
takes place. By unearthing its features, we can explore the ways it lends a framing to H&O, 
J&S, Taylor, Verbeek, and K&B’s treatments of interaction*. In doing so we will attempt to 
move further still from characterising this discourse as between two opposing solutions and 
rather as more broadly symptomatic of the state of affairs in HCI research.  
3. Why interaction* now? 
So why this increased focus on interaction* now? We can frame a possible answer by 
elaborating a cluster of interrelated concerns floating around HCI presently and historically. 
These include: multiplying sub/supra-communities, increasing intellectual differences, 
shifting senses of purpose, negotiating academia and industry, questioning disciplinarity, and 
doing away with old intellectual concepts and adopting new ones. Many of these are not 
exclusive to HCI but they are likely exacerbated by the peculiar makeup of its overlapping 
communities and particular confluence of inputs (cf. Grudin, 2017). We also admit we likely 
have an ACM SIGCHI bias. 
Multiplying Sub/Supra-Communities. In recent years HCI research communities have been 
changing along various dimensions. Taking the ACM CHI conference as a bellwether10, there 
has been significant community growth in terms of sheer participation rates rather than 
attendance. Materials submitted for CHI in the early 2000s hovered at ~400-500 items, 
whereas CHI 2018 has seen a rise to over 2500 items11, in spite of present attendance (2010s 
onwards) being similar to or only slightly higher than those seen during the dotcom boom of 
the late 1990s. This disparity of growth between participation and attendance plays into 
community divergence as new areas and interests come online to service smaller sub/supra-
communities, which are then accommodated by a growing number of conference 
                                               
10 We fully accept that the use of the CHI conference in this way is a limitation to this point in the argument 
given that it does not take into account other HCI communities of research. 
11  See https://sigchi.org/conferences/conference-history/CHI/ (verified May 2019). 
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subcommittees. We speculate that increased participation could play into greater visibility of 
divergent languages of interaction* (which perhaps precipitates H&O’s paper). 
Increasing Intellectual Differences. HCI’s research communities have become increasingly 
intellectually diverse over the past decade, including a range of new initiatives such as 
fabrication and making, postcolonial computing, labour rights, inclusion and diversity, AI 
and HCI, critical and speculative design, and digital civics, among others. As Rogers puts it, 
this has been a process of HCI “recasting its net ever wider” (Rogers 2012, p. 3). Such 
recasting has introduced new domains, approaches, agenda, research styles, and different 
contribution types. And with this comes an increase in the range of possible points of 
difference between members of HCI communities, and correspondingly alternatives (and 
perhaps, challenges) to normative, unstated stances on interaction*. 
Shifting Sense of Shared Purpose. Perhaps in response to these developments, concerns are 
raised by some HCI researchers about a lack (or loss, depending upon one’s point of view) of 
coherent shared purpose in HCI research (Beck & Stolterman, 2017). For example, Liu et al. 
(2014) and Kostakos (2015) make the case for HCI having an absence of what they call 
“motor themes”—jointly oriented-to endeavours within HCI that establish HCI as a “normal 
science” (Kuhn, 1970)12. The perceived absence of coherence reflects discontiguities in 
researchers’ orientations about what kind of thing HCI is as a disciplinary object (Blackwell, 
2015). In other words, coherence and shared purpose debates seek to resolve broad, perceived 
conceptual problems for HCI, of which we argue interaction* is but the latest iteration of. 
H&O make just this connection in their 2017 CHI paper, identifying Liu et al.’s work as a 
motivating factor in their topicalisation of interaction*. 
Academia and Industry. Related to the shifting senses of HCI’s purpose is a complex set of 
challenges based around the political relations of HCI’s various community members and 
their research agenda. Initially narrowly focussed on improving usability, expansion towards 
various “grand challenges” (Shneiderman et al., 2016) such as development goals has ensued.  
It is not unusual to hear members of HCI communities expressing desires to positively effect 
                                               
12 The Interaction Science Spotlight (Howes et al., 2014) provides an interesting contrast to this call for 
coherence; for “Interaction Science”, it is researchers’ existing sense of alignment and agreement that is being 
brought to prominence rather than the perceived need for alignment and agreement itself doing the driving (as 
in the case of (Liu et al., 2014; Kostakos, 2015)).  
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change in the world through HCI’s design practices. Widespread adoption and the structural-
societal (economic, social, political) embedding of HCI-relevant technologies has continued 
apace, and yet although such technologies touch almost every part of everyday life, their 
design is dictated primarily by large technology corporations and (vigorously invested) 
startups, as opposed to alternate models, e.g., government or hybrid partnerships as in 
Scandinavian participatory design traditions. Most notably, social media (but also other 
network technologies) has played a significant role in this, backed by the massive accrual of 
personal data to private entities, and most recently, increased application of Machine 
Learning based systems to classify and sort the human subjects of such systems (e.g., face 
recognition). Yet the corporations involved deeply in driving many of these changes are 
represented in HCI communities (often blandly referred to with the gloss ‘industry’). This 
creates further frictions in the configurations of relationships between different HCI 
community members’ orientations as to what constitutes ‘good’ interaction*. 
Questioning Disciplinarity. As digital technologies—products and services and systems—
have become widespread, so naturally the interests of other fields and disciplines towards 
investigating HCI-relevant matters has increased. Calls for interdisciplinarity frequently drive 
research funding structures. Conceptualising HCI as a discipline (as has been argued against) 
can lead to a sense of stakes (or perhaps rights) to some particular intellectual territory by 
HCI communities which is increasingly ‘trespassed’ by ‘others’. This point is as much about 
how HCI draws its own boundaries (interaction* being a case in point) as how communities 
operating within them in some capacity notice such matters.  
Doing Away with Older Concepts. We have a collection of historical accounts of progress 
and change in HCI research. Such accounts might articulate this history as forming “waves” 
(Bødker, 2006), “turns” (Rogers, 2012) or “paradigms” (Harrison et al., 2007). Of these, it is 
perhaps primarily the use of “paradigm” with respect to HCI—with its allusions to Kuhn’s 
well-known description of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1970)—that might suggest most 
clearly a connection with ideas of doing away with or superseding HCI concepts that are no 
longer of use, such as interaction*. However, this is not what seems to have been meant by 
Harrison et al. in that they argue “shifts in the underlying metaphor of interaction” for HCI 
means that “new paradigms do not disprove the old paradigms, but instead provide 
alternative ways of thinking” (p. 3). Nevertheless, once used, the Kuhnian sense of 
“paradigm” tends to prevail in spite of the authors’ appeals within the paper (a strategic error, 
perhaps, in including such a term within the paper’s title).  
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In sum, this cluster represents significant concerns: about the model(s) HCI researchers 
express a desire to operate along the lines of, about what HCI’s shared values are along 
which researchers jointly travel, about how members of HCI communities relate to one 
another and upon what basis those relations are conducted, about how HCI ‘stays together’ as 
sets of communities with conflicting pulls over interaction*, and, finally, about how HCI 
might even tell a ‘coherent’ and agreed-upon story of its history when there are multiple ways 
of squaring what the role of interaction* is in that.  
If HCI communities cannot tell more pluralistic stories of their history or find ways of living 
together around shared concepts and connected subcommunities, then interaction* poses 
problems. For other disciplines that have grappled with similar issues, the stakes are 
threefold: (1) coherence, (2) status, and (3) progress (Beck & Stolterman, 2017). While it 
makes sense that mulling over matters of formal definition, or ‘ironing things out’, acts as a 
salve for these concerns (discipining work), it is also possible to lose things when we do this. 
This is akin to proposing a set of guiding or ‘big’ questions for a discipline. Doing so may 
create the appearance of having achieved greater intellectual cohesion, yet, at the same time, 
it also thwarts creative efforts to take a field in new directions. If we agree on formal 
definitions, could this somehow be construed as self-imposing intellectual constraints and 
undermining the potential for more innovative or creative construals of interaction*?  We 
want to avoid such ‘ironing work’ and instead focus on examining the sea we swim in: 
language. 
4. For interaction*: avoiding confusions and deflating problems 
Although typically configured as matters of coherence, status, and progress, we argue that it 
is not necessary for HCI to see these things as problems. Instead, we want to make an 
argument for an orientation to interaction* that trades on its language value, as a 
promiscuous concept. This sidesteps a binary of ‘interaction* definition’ versus ‘interaction* 
dispensing’. We believe that rethinking the framing of the perceived problems with 
interaction* as language troubles might help HCI communities’ cohesion and channel further 
debates on HCI’s chosen senses of interaction*, rather than another attempt at (re)articulating 
concepts. Here we do this in two ways. Firstly, we draw out a distinction between the ways 
interaction* is treated in formal research discourses and the ways it can be treated as a matter 
of practice—we do this to avoid confusion. Toward this end, we ask what work has 
interaction* done—and what work might it be currently doing—for HCI researchers? 
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Secondly, and in asking this, we attempt to deflate problems that have been argued dog 
interaction* by simply underlining how the same words can find distinct (and mostly 
untroublesome) meanings in different uses. 
On the first point, the research we’ve discussed thus far tends to favour examining how 
interaction* plays out in HCI communities’ academic, formal discourse: i.e., that found in the 
research record. H&O offer us a comprehensive and scholarly account, but this is only half 
the story. What we are missing here is research practice, i.e., the nitty gritty practical 
accomplishments involved in getting HCI research done. Maybe considering this can also tell 
us about interaction* as lubrication for research?  
To put it another way, we are speaking of HCI research’s necessarily local rationality and its 
mundane resolute, practical reasoning (see Lynch, 1993; Pollner, 1987). So, while H&O refer 
to a “vocabulary and [...] reasoning apparatus” of interaction, we want to consider how 
interaction* is embedded within the local reasonings of this practice: the situated, 
autochthonous ‘languages of interaction*’ or ‘interaction* talk’ that is major concern of the 
lifeworld of the institutions, labs, research groups, community networks, etc. that practice 
HCI. There are, of course, many different interactions* for different species of this HCI 
research practice and the places it is exercised in. There are thus ways of operationalising 
interaction* in community practice that do not presently reside in HCI’s literature and cannot 
easily be subject to definition such as in H&O’s schema. These then become ways of talking 
about interaction* into which practical reasoning about method and technologies become 
entwined—unstated—when they surface within the HCI community. Formal records of 
research tends to leave these practical reasonings ‘on the cutting room floor’.  
While one could imagine a programme of research that begins to articulate what those HCI 
practices are which embed interaction*, we have another more pertinent point to make from 
this. Contra H&O, we think interaction* has actually been usefully underdefined. This 
underdefinition is in support precisely of the everyday, dispersed and diverse treatments of 
interaction* in practice. 
What does underdefinition look like? It is clear from H&O’s instructive account that when 
HCI researchers talk about interaction* it can be used to say a great many things that may 
nevertheless in certain kinds of senses be ‘incompatible’ with one another. As we have stated 
before, this is generally not problematic; many interesting concepts cease to be interesting 
when precisely defined and doing so could render them less useful anyway (Schroeder, 2006, 
 15 
pp. 153-154). One might reasonably say—perhaps in a research paper if we confine ourselves 
to what is presently available to us—that someone tapping a touch screen is ‘interacting’. Just 
as we can say that posting on social media is ‘interaction’. Or that someone being physically 
tracked is ‘interacting’ with a geolocation system. Or we might say that ‘interactions’ are 
taking place with, around, or through technologies embedded in the social life of the home. 
Or, perhaps, we might even say someone using an urban public bicycle hire scheme is 
‘interacting’ with networks not only of systems and data and other people but other kinds of 
discernible objects (“social, technical, scientific, intellectual, organizational, political, ethical 
worlds” (Taylor, 2015, p. 50)). Since such uses tend to imply intentionality we can also 
develop ways of talking about “unwitting” forms of interaction (Benford et al., 2006, p. 8; 
Reeves, 2011, p. 138) or perhaps “implicit interaction” (Ju et al., 2008). These different uses 
sit alongside one another and do not call out for policing or administrative conceptual work 
(cf. J&S, which presents some valuable ways of talking about a particular stance on 
interaction* yet also—very much unnecessarily in our view—argues for the need of 
disciplining “definitions and measures”). 
It seems unlikely to us that formulations like the above would cause a researcher reading a 
paper to squint and shake their head, as though using the word ‘interact’ (and its derivatives) 
to describe these different activities is in some way deeply incomprehensible to them; indeed, 
the unique characteristics of use might be “intuitively resonant” (Galle, 2011, p. 82) with 
readers as they bring their own senses of use to bear on what it is that others might be 
meaning. We do not deny that confusions may occasionally result. However, this is not 
ultimately resolvable through further definition (setting up intellectual straightjackets for 
future work) or through starting to abandon interaction* in favour of new paradigms (which 
may work against the value of retaining one of the few shared interests that features in HCI’s 
complex cross-cutting communities). Further, as we have pointed out above in HCI practice, 
interaction* (gestalt: its language, its concepts) always appears in context. Even when left 
‘undefined’ in formal research records, contextual details—such as the broader topic of a 
paper, the author(s), their home discipline(s), institutional affiliations, etc.—shape the way 
we might normally imbue interaction* with particular conventional meanings.  
To reiterate, arguing for interaction* means accepting it as conceptually promiscuous: as a 
broker—embedded both (yet differently) in HCI research practices and its formal 
representation in the literature. Through this, interaction* helps manage the complex 
relationships between increasingly diverse research communities and influences that 
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associate themselves in some way with HCI (primarily under the banner of conferences like 
CHI)13. 
5. A therapeutic reframing of interaction* 
Interaction* in HCI is probably not a resolvable matter—and it need not be so. If instead we 
value interaction*’s capacity and permissiveness for absorbing different sensibilities, 
approaches, or perspectives, and if we focus less on agreements and more on embracing the 
possibility and generativity of misunderstandings, then HCI will need to work out ways to 
surface, deal with, accommodate, and unpack those misunderstandings14. Firstly, we present 
a therapeutic attitude towards talking about troubles around interaction* and offer a sketch of 
how this might play out. Secondly, and more briefly, we reflect on how the structures of HCI 
might work against applying therapies to interaction*, leaving us with questions as to how 
HCI could be reordered to support such approaches.  
The kind of therapeutic attitude we speak of turns on developing an appreciation for the role 
of language in use (in our case, within the HCI research community), and how the meaning 
of language, like ‘the concepts of interaction’, is formed in and as that use. This matter has 
been addressed previously by Wittgenstein, Ryle or Austin (amongst others; see 
Wittgenstein, 2009; Ryle, 1949; Austin, 1962). To begin, we can reread a portion of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (2009) as talking about how formalised versions 
of interaction* may play out in HCI’s discourse (“a game”15) and what to do about it: 
Here the fundamental fact is that we lay down rules, a technique, for playing a game, 
and that then, when we follow the rules, things don’t turn out as we had assumed. So 
we are, as it were, entangled in our own rules. 
                                               
13 We are hesitant to use Star and Griesemer’s (1989) much over-used notion of a “boundary object” as it 
pertained (originally) to collaborating (scientific) communities centred around identifiable shared projects. We 
are cautious of stretching the notion (as others might have done) to describe the circumstances of broader 
community relations that we are speaking of. 
14 Consider calls for pluralistic design-oriented HCI (Bardzell, 2019), or, in comparison, territoriality over styles 
of ethnography exercised in HCI (Crabtree et al., 2009). 
15 Wittgenstein’s sense of language games is often misinterpreted. We are not talking about a literal game 
(Schroeder, 2006, p. 129). 
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This entanglement in our own rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey. 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §125) 
Ryle and Austin’s careful considerations of what it means to be “entangled in our own rules” 
in the course of language in use offers us some practical points on interaction*. Where 
Wittgenstein is therapeutic, Ryle adds a layer of the methodical (as does Austin), promoting 
an approach that takes words and their senses seriously by rolling them around enough to 
shake out both their meanings in use as well as their potential for (philosophical) conceptual 
confusions—with the latter to be avoided, mainly by reminding us of the former. Although 
primarily concentrating on conflicts between the philosophical and everyday modes in which 
‘the mental’ and ‘thinking words’ feature16, Ryle has a broader concern: “not how to apply 
[concepts], but how to classify them, or in what categories to put them” (Ryle, 1949, p. 49). 
Austin, in turn, considers how doings with words (e.g., promising, marrying, or betting) lead 
to a complex and potentially highly varied set of different senses in which things are said, and 
thus what is concretely being done, despite identical formulations of such statements. 
Statements of interaction* seem particularly vulnerable to the kinds of confusions outlined by 
Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin, unless carefully unpacked in a particular way. This is not 
definitional work, though. Rather, it entails teasing apart vernacular from technical and 
distinguishing differences between the variety of senses interaction* takes, including our 
prior distinction between formal accounts in the literature and in routine research practices. 
This is what we mean when we say therapeutic.  
Given the abstractness of the discussion so far, we want to now consider what a therapeutic 
approach could look like for HCI. What follows is a sketch.  
There are many unspoken senses that articulations of interaction* seem to leverage. When we 
say technologies, systems, devices are ‘interactive’, we necessarily embed them within 
mundane social order — i.e., the accomplished stability of reality as the social world (Pollner, 
1987). That is, we leverage ordinary understandings of interaction* to talk about what people 
do with and around computational technologies at the selfsame time as we (might) speak of 
what people do with other people. For instance, ‘talking’ is something we might say we are 
                                               
16 Arguing against Decartes (the “official doctrine”), Ryle pointedly illustrates that while philosophers generate 
“theory of the mind”, ‘anyone’ can engage successfully in “describing the minds of others and in prescribing for 
them” (Ryle, 1949). 
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doing with people or speech-based technologies such as personal assistants, but we do not 
confuse one for the other17 (Porcheron et al., 2018). The (always situated) senses of ‘talking’ 
do quite different things: talking in court (Atkinson and Drew, 1979) is quite different to 
talking with an intimate partner which is again quite different to talking to a machine (replete 
with ironic possibilities, cf. Reeves et al. (2019)). This blurring of interaction* —  drawing of 
various concepts of interaction from our ordinary language —comes with a relevant repertoire 
of ‘interaction words’ like ‘response’, ‘react’, ‘alert’, ‘remind’, ‘interrupt’, ‘share’, ‘detect’ 
and so on.  
We talk about what interfaces, systems, devices do, or have done to them, in terms like this, 
but we have to keep in mind that these are also ways of talking about people individually, and 
jointly, using and living with machines. These ways of talking about machines are grounded 
in practical and everyday experiences of language in use, which means they borrow from the 
everyday sense but acquire technical senses in HCI discourses. As implied by H&O’s 
catalogue of interaction*, different ways of talking about interaction* bring with them 
particular bodies of language, their associations, implications and insinuations. These 
different genres further imply more particular families of interaction words, also borrowing 
from an everyday sense.  
Taking H&O’s catalogue, consider “interaction as dialogue”, which uses a language of turns, 
feedback, goals and sub-goals or “interaction as transmission” which speaks of noise, 
throughput, capacity, etc. “interaction as tool use” brings with it senses of what one might do 
with tools and toolic connections—tools break, tools amplify, etc. Considering “interaction as 
optimal behaviour”, we enter the language of behaviour including costs and rewards, rational 
and irrational actions, and so forth. “Interaction as embodiment” speaks of intentions, 
context, situation, coupling, etc., while “interaction as experience” leverages a host of 
normative reasonings about ‘feeling words’, such as: emotions, surprise, stimulation, and also 
aesthetics, expectation, etc. 
In a therapeutic approach, HCI’s language of interaction* acts as a provocation to facilitate 
the work of its conceptual promiscuity, which includes: foregrounding and supporting the 
exploration of conceptual confusions, surfacing the troubles of categorisation, reminding us 
                                               
17 Except, perhaps in some exceptional circumstances we could concoct. 
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of the play of metaphor, and foregrounding the prevalent leverage of mundane senses of 
terms, which might then be played with ‘fast and loose’. By engaging in this work, we can 
promote more generative discussions and greater depth of understanding of interaction* in 
HCI. Returning to our family of affiliated ‘interaction words’ (‘response’, ‘react’, etc.) let us 
consider ‘interrupt’, a key interaction mechanism in HCI (Janssen et al., 2015). What does 
‘interrupt’ mean specifically and what might the different senses be for an app, an agent, a 
personal device, an Internet of Things / device ‘ecosystem’, a social network 
recommendation, a friend’s message, or an organisation’s call-to-action to ‘interrupt’ us?  
There are many senses in which we might make ‘interrupt’ meaningful, and it’s likely that 
you, the reader, are constructing scenarios to make sense of ‘interrupt’ yourself. Does it make 
sense to categorise a device and an IoT ecosystem as interrupting us in the same way? What 
about push notifications? Do they interrupt in the same way as a productivity app reminding 
us to ‘get back to work’? We can say a social network interrupts us to deliver a 
recommendation of some kind, but is this sense of ‘interruption’ the same as that produced by 
a message from a friend? When we say an agent interrupts someone, do we mean it in the 
same sense as an interruption on the street by a police officer? Something could be 
categorised as an interruption by an app’s design(er) but treated as a welcome intervention, 
for example, by the ‘receiver’ of that interruption. Overall, we might wonder what it means 
for us to use interaction* as a frame within which to talk about ‘interruptions as interactions’ 
that are generated or mediated by different kinds of technologies in different circumstances —
 things which ordinarily take much of their sense from mundane, everyday sociality. When 
we examine the literature on interruption, it is often unclear what corresponding sense of 
interruption might be meant. For instance, we might point to the Special Issue edited by 
Janssen et al. (2015), in which something called “self-interruption” is subsumed into a 
general sense of interruption, a concept itself that is also left undifferentiated or textured. 
Our point here is that interaction*—its families of languages and concepts—are far more 
complex than any of the interaction* debate has presently articulated. The therapeutic 
approach is a way to live with misunderstandings, confusions, and conflations, while resisting 
urges to work toward resolving epistemic differences. 
To close, we want to raise HCI’s structural, disciplinary conundrums and the interaction* 
debate. Firstly, we are reluctant to recommend any distinct ways ‘forward’. The idea of 
structural progress is embedded in how we talk about interaction* in HCI. If we are 
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proposing an embrace of interaction*’s promiscuity, this might also mean potentially doing 
away with—or at least being cognisant and wary of—various normative discourses of 
scientific progress (i.e., replicability, cumulation, forward motion, etc.; Reeves (2015)). 
Instead, we restrict ourselves to observations and open questions about HCI’s organisation, 
which we feel are more generative than the provision of implications.  
The present structural organisation of HCI (as with many academic communities) tends 
towards bifurcation. Premier examples of this include the ACM CHI conference’s 
subcommittee structure18 which represents a particular solution to the practical problem of 
scaling participation rates that we mentioned earlier. However, this kind of structural 
bifurcation also mixes domain, method, epistemology, and contribution. Structures like this 
might invite rigidity or confusion in HCI, offering little provision for managing differences in 
interaction*. We then might ask: how could we rethink such structures to foreground and 
make differences in interaction* productive? Present structures seem more likely to promote 
conflict and confusion.  
6. Conclusions 
A multifaceted discourse composed of interaction*—its attendant concepts and languages—
prevails as a concern in HCI. Rarely is this explicit, and mostly it is implied. As sets of 
concepts, interaction* is about research practices as much as it is about the words HCI 
researchers use when they generate talk and texts. Interaction* acts as a common 
recognisable interest, and it is perhaps the only thing identifiably bridging gaps between 
increasingly disparate HCI communities. Perhaps HCI might be better off being more 
cognisant of the multiplicity of ways in which interaction* — admittedly confusing at times—
lets us talk about what is a massively varied focal interest. It is probably worth pausing for 
thought before we either seek to tighten its useful lack of definition or dispense with it in 
view of new conceptual frontiers. We think there might be value in rediscovering interaction* 
for its sense of intellectual promiscuity. We believe it is perfectly reasonable to hold multiple, 
                                               
18 As of CHI 2019, these were as follows: User Experience and Usability, Specific Application Areas, Learning, 
Education and Families, Interaction Beyond the Individual, Games and Play, Privacy, Security, and 
Visualization, Health Accessibility and Aging, Design, Interaction techniques, Devices and Modalities, 
Understanding People: Theory, Concepts, Methods, Engineering Interactive Systems and Technologies. 
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potentially contradictory senses of interaction*, get along with each other, and be critically 
productive as HCI-affiliated communities. But we probably need something like therapies to 
help us live with our frictions rather than finding ways to eliminate them through strategies of 
discipline. However, present structures of HCI might hinder this, so we perhaps should begin 
asking the question: how might we reorganise our HCI communities to facilitate 
interaction*? 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work is supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [grant 
numbers EP/M02315X/1, EP/K025848/1]. We gratefully acknowledge valuable feedback and 
input from Antti Oulasvirta, Alex Taylor, and Jocelyn Spence when writing this paper, as 
well as insightful comment from anonymous reviewers.  
References 
J. Maxwell Atkinson and Paul Drew. 1979. Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal 
Interaction in Judicial Settings. London: Macmillan. 
J. L. Austin. 1962. How to do things with words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Gisela Susanne Bahr. 2013. Editorial: Journal of Interaction Science. Journal of Interaction 
Science 2013 1:3, Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/2194-0827-1-3 
Jeffrey Bardzell. 2019. Design researchers need a shared program, not a 
divorce. Interactions 26, 2 (February 2019), 22-23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3306464 
Jordan Beck and Hamid R. Ekbia. 2018. The Theory-Practice Gap as Generative Metaphor. 
In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 
‘18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Paper 620, 11 pages. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174194 
Jordan Beck and Erik Stolterman. 2017. Reviewing the Big Questions Literature: or, Should 
HCI Have Big Questions?. In Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Designing Interactive 
Systems (DIS ‘17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 969-981. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3064663.3064673 
 22 
Steve Benford, Andy Crabtree, Stuart Reeves, Jennifer Sheridan, Alan Dix, Martin Flintham, 
and Adam Drozd. 2006. The Frame of the Game: Blurring the Boundary between Fiction and 
Reality in Mobile Experiences. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors 
in Computing Systems (CHI ‘06). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 427-436. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1124772.1124836 
Alan F. Blackwell. 2015. HCI as an Inter-Discipline. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual 
ACM Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA 
‘15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 503-516. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2702613.2732505 
Susanne Bødker. 2006. When second wave HCI meets third wave challenges. In Proceedings 
of the 4th Nordic conference on Human-computer interaction: changing roles (NordiCHI 
‘06), Anders Mørch, Konrad Morgan, Tone Bratteteig, Gautam Ghosh, and Dag Svanaes 
(Eds.). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1-8. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1182475.1182476 
Andrew Crabtree, Tom Rodden, Peter Tolmie, and Graham Button. 2009. Ethnography 
considered harmful. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (CHI ‘09). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 879-888. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1518701.1518835 
Shuji Deng, Nan Jiang, Jian Chang, Shihui Guo, Jian J. Zhang. 2017. Understanding the 
impact of multimodal interaction using gaze informed mid-air gesture control in 3D virtual 
objects manipulation. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 105, September 
2017, pp. 68-80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2017.04.002 
Hugh Dubberly, Usman Haque, and Paul Pangaro. 2009. What is interaction? Are there 
different types? Interactions 16(1), 69-75. ACM, New York, NY, USA. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1456202.1456220 
Per Galle. 2011. Foundational and instrumental design theory, Design Issues 27(4):81–94. 
Harold Garfinkel. 2002. Ethnomethodology’s Program. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Surjya Ghosh, Kaustubh Hiware, Niloy Ganguly, Bivas Mitra, and Pradipta De. 2019. 
Emotion detection from touch interactions during text entry on smartphones. International 
Journal of Human-Computer Studies, In Press, Accepted Manuscript. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2019.04.005 
 23 
Jonathan Grudin. 2017. From Tool to Partner: The Evolution of Human-Computer 
Interaction (Synthesis Lectures on Human-Centered Informatics). 2017 10:1, i-183. 
Steve Harrison, Courtesy Art, Deborah Tatar, Phoebe Sengers. 2007. The Three Paradigms of 
HCI. In Proceedings of alt.chi, CHI ‘07, San Jose, CA, May 2007.  
Kasper Hornbæk and Antti Oulasvirta. 2017. What Is Interaction? In Proceedings of the 2017 
CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ‘17). ACM, New York, NY, 
USA, 5040-5052. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3025453.3025765 
Andrew Howes, Benjamin R. Cowan, Christian P. Janssen, Anna L. Cox, Paul Cairns, 
Anthony J. Hornof, Stephen J. Payne and Peter Pirolli. 2014. Interaction science SIG: 
overcoming challenges. In CHI ‘14 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems (CHI EA ‘14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1127-1130. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2559206.2559208 
Lars-Erik Janlert and Erik Stolterman. 2017a. The Meaning of Interactivity: Some Proposals 
for Definitions and Measures. Hum.-Comput. Interact. 32, 3 (May 2017), 103-138. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07370024.2016.1226139  
Lars-Erik Janlert and Erik Stolterman. 2017b. Things That Keep Us Busy: The Elements of 
Interaction. MIT Press (September 2017). 
Christian P. Janssen, Sandy J.J. Gould, Simon Y.W. Li, Duncan P. Brumby, Anna L. Cox, 
2015. Integrating knowledge of multitasking and interruptions across different perspectives 
and research methods. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 79, 2015, pp. 
1-5, Elsevier, ISSN 1071-5819. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2015.03.002 
Wendy Ju, Brian A. Lee, and Scott R. Klemmer. 2008. Range: exploring implicit interaction 
through electronic whiteboard design. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on 
Computer supported cooperative work (CSCW ‘08). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 17-26. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/1460563.1460569 
Vassilis Kostakos. 2015. The big hole in HCI research. Interactions 22, 2 (February 2015), 
48-51. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2729103 
Vassilis Kostakos and Mirco Musolesi. 2013. Introduction to the special issue on social 
networks and ubiquitous interactions. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 
71(9), pp. 859-861. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2013.04.002 
 24 
Thomas S. Kuhn. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Kari Kuutti and Liam J. Bannon. 2014. The turn to practice in HCI: towards a research 
agenda. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 
(CHI ‘14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3543-3552. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2556288.2557111 
Yong Liu, Jorge Goncalves, Denzil Ferreira, Bei Xiao, Simo Hosio, and Vassilis Kostakos. 
2014. CHI 1994-2013: mapping two decades of intellectual progress through co-word 
analysis. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems (CHI ‘14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3553-3562. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2556288.2556969 
Michael Lynch. 1993. Scientific practice and ordinary action: ethnomethodology and social 
studies of science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Melvin Pollner. 1987. Mundane reason: reality in everyday life and sociological discourse. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [Italian Edition, Rome: Il Molino; 1995] 
Antti Oulasvirta and Kasper Hornbæk. 2016. HCI Research as Problem-Solving. 
In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 
‘16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 4956-4967. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858283 
Martin Porcheron, Joel E. Fischer, Stuart Reeves, and Sarah Sharples. 2018. Voice Interfaces 
in Everyday Life. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (CHI ‘18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Paper 640, 12 pages. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174214 
Yvonne Rogers. 2012. HCI Theory: Classical, Modern and Contemporary, Synthesis 
Lectures on Human-Centered Informatics 5, 2, Morgan & Claypool, 2012, 1-129. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2200/S00418ED1V01Y201205HCI014 
Stuart Reeves. 2011. Designing interfaces in public settings: Understanding the role of the 
spectator in Human-Computer Interaction. Springer, January 2011. 
 25 
Stuart Reeves. 2015. Human-computer interaction as science. In Proceedings of The Fifth 
Decennial Aarhus Conference on Critical Alternatives (CA ‘15). Aarhus University Press 73-
84. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7146/aahcc.v1i1.21296 
Stuart Reeves, Martin Porcheron, and Joel Fischer. 2018. “This is not what we wanted”: 
designing for conversation with voice interfaces. Interactions 26, 1 (December 2018), 46-51. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3296699 
Davide Rocchesso and Stefania Serafin. 2009. Sonic interaction design. International Journal 
of Human-Computer Studies, 67(11), pp. 905-906. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2009.09.009 
Gilbert Ryle. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. 
Severin Schroeder. 2006. Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle. Polity Press. 
Ben Shneiderman, Catherine Plaisant, Maxine Cohen, Steven Jacobs, Niklas Elmqvist, and 
Nicholoas Diakopoulos. 2016. Grand challenges for HCI researchers. Interactions 23, 5 
(August 2016), 24-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2977645 
Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer. 1989. Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and 
Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies of Science 19, no. 3 (August 1989): 387–420. DOI: 
10.1177/030631289019003001. 
Dag Svanæs. 2013. Philosophy of interaction. The Encyclopedia of Human-Computer 
Interaction, 2nd Ed. https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/book/the-encyclopedia-of-
human-computer-interaction-2nd-ed/philosophy-of-interaction 
Alex Taylor. 2015. After interaction. Interactions 22, 5 (August 2015), 48-53. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2809888 
Peter-Paul Verbeek. 2015. Beyond interaction: A short introduction to mediation theory. 
Interactions 22, 3 (April 2015), 26-31. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2751314 
John R. Wilson. 2005. Interaction with virtual environments. International Journal of 
Human-Computer Studies, 64(3), March 2006, p. 157. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.08.002 
 26 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. 2009. Philosophical investigations, 4th edition, P. M. S. Hacker and 
Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell.  
